Probability in Quantum Mechanics: The Everett Interpretation and the Decision-Theoretic Program by Chua, Meng Shuen
Probability in Quantum Mechanics
The Everett Interpretation and the Decision-Theoretic Program
Thesis by
Mengshuen Chua
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of
Bachelor of Science in History and Philosophy of Science
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Pasadena, California
2015
c© 2015
Mengshuen Chua
All Rights Reserved
ii
Acknowledgments
I would firstly like to thank my advisers Christopher Hitchcock and Sean Carroll, of the philosophy
department and the physics department respectively, for providing helpful guidance and insightful
comments for my drafts. I would also like to thank Yihui Quek (M.I.T.) and Naoki Eto (Caltech)
for their critical proofreading and suggestions. Next, there are the people whom I owe a huge debt
of gratitude for introducing me to the art and science of understanding the world, and they are
the teachers and professors during my academic career, in Dunman High School and Caltech. I
would also like to thank the Caltech Library Services for providing wonderful assistance for the
much needed references for my thesis work.
Lastly, my foray into physics and philosophy would not have been possible without the gracious
support from my family and friends, so thank you.
Any errors are mine and mine alone.
Mengshuen Chua
Pasadena, California
iii
Abstract
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is an increasingly popular alternative to the
traditional Copenhagen interpretation, but there are a few major issues that prevent the widespread
adoption. One of these issues is the origin of probabilities in the Everett interpretation, which this
thesis will attempt to survey. The most successful resolution of the probability problem thus far is the
decision-theoretic program, which attempts to frame probabilities as outcomes of rational decision
making. This marks a departure from orthodox interpretations of probabilities in the physical
sciences, where probabilities are thought to be objective, stemming from symmetry considerations.
This thesis will attempt to offer evaluations on the decision-theoretic program.
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1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics has always been an enigma – it changed the course of physics from deterministic
to probabilistic, not due to our ignorance about the exact initial conditions or the exact microscopic
ensemble of particles, but from fundamental randomness. Why is quantum mechanics a theory of
calculating probabilities, and where does probability enter the theory in the first place?
It turns out that there may be a way to derive the probabilities from considerations based on
rational decision making, and the result matches our theoretical predictions for those probabilities.
These probabilities arise from a branching structure as all possible outcomes are realized, and we are
concerned about all the outcomes in these branches. The following chapters will serve to elaborate
on such views of quantum mechanics and probability.
2 The Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
Conventional quantum mechanics, also known as the Copenhagen interpretation1 of quantum
mechanics, is the de facto standard in the study of quantum theory in physics. The Copenhagen
interpretation, devised by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg in the 1920s,2 involves, most notably,
the following axioms (Dirac, 1930):
1. Quantum states are represented by wavefunctions ψ, which are vectors in Hilbert space,
2. The evolution of wavefunctions in space and time is governed by the deterministic Schrödinger
equation, that is also linear and unitary,
3. An observable is a physical quantity measured by the corresponding Hermitian operator
Aˆ, and this measurement yields a particular real eigenvalue a from the eigenvalue equation
Aˆ |ψ〉 = a |ψ〉,
4. The probability of getting any particular eigenstate3 is equal to the absolute square of the
amplitude for the corresponding eigenstate in the eigenbasis. This is also known as the Born
rule,
5. After the measurement is performed, the wavefunction “collapses” to a new state in which
the wavefunction is localized precisely on the observed eigenvector (as opposed to being in a
superposition4 of many different possibilities).
2.1 Deterministic Equation, Indeterministic Process
However, this conventional interpretation poses many problems, especially when we consider the last
axiom with regard to the wavefunction collapse. In the Copenhagen interpretation, the wavefunction
1To be exact, “Copenhagen” usually refers to an epistemic approach of calculating probabilities, and not for a
complete interpretation. However, the alternative label of “textbook interpretation” sounds too ill-defined, so the use
of “Copenhagen” would be maintained throughout the paper.
2The Copenhagen interpretation is named after the birthplace of the idea.
3When the wavefunction is expressed in a particular eigenbasis.
4Superposition refers to a linear combination of quantum states. § 2.2 contains a detailed discussion of superposition.
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collapse is part of the measurement process to enable us to get a definite value during/after5
the observation. For a detailed discussion about the possible mechanisms of collapse, refer to
Albert (1992). However, the Schrödinger equation is completely deterministic as it describes the
time-evolution of the wavefunction, and it is not clear how and why the wavefunction collapse enters
the theory to make observation of eigenvalues a random (or more precisely, a statistical) process.
Historically, this is known as the measurement problem.
[Any] measurement suspends the law that otherwise governs the continuous time-
dependence of the ψ-function and brings about in it a quite different change, not
governed by any laws, but rather dictated by the result of the measurement. But laws
differing from the usual ones cannot apply during a measurement, for objectively viewed
it is a natural process like any other, and it cannot interrupt the orderly course of natural
events. (Schrödinger, 1935)
Schrödinger viewed the collapse process as a suspension of the usual natural laws, and to him such
process should not occur. This objection is in the interpretation of the collapse process, and he
never did reconcile these ideas (Jaeger, 2009). Weinberg (1998) made a similar point. This paradox
is frequently the source of motivation for alternative theories for quantum mechanics, of which the
Everett interpretation is one of them.
2.2 Superposition and Interference
If |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 are vectors in the same Hilbert space, then it follows that α |ψ〉+ β |ψ′〉 is another
vector6 in the Hilbert space, since this satisfies the axioms of the Hilbert space. For cases like this,
we call it a superposition. This superposition works also because the Schrödinger equation is linear;
as such, a linear combination of solutions which are the eigenstates is also a valid solution. For us
to get physically-realizable states, however, we need |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, also known as normalization.
Focusing on the last axiom, we see that in wavefunction collapse, the wavefunction with a super-
position of states is reduced to a single eigenstate with the associated eigenvalue. Mathematically,
before the observation, we have the quantum state given by
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
αi |φi〉 , (2.1)
where each αi represents the coefficient (or probability amplitude,7 in Copenhagen interpretation)
of the ith eigenstate. The (orthogonal) eigenstates |φi〉 represent the different possible states or
outcomes for a particular observable. After measurement, we have
|ψ〉 → |φk〉 , (2.2)
5As the duration (and in general, the dynamics) of the collapse is unknown, we don’t have a clear distinction
between ‘during’ and ‘after’ an observation.
6α and β are complex numbers, since the Hilbert space is a complex vector space.
7The coefficient, or the probability amplitude, can be complex.
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where |φk〉 is one of the eigenstates. The probability of getting to such an eigenstate is given by the
fourth axiom, or Pk = |αk|2 before the observation, and after the measurement, αk = 1.
Using the example of the cat belonging to a famous physicist, if we have a cat in a state of
superposition, where |χ〉 being the state of the cat as alive, and |θ〉 as being the state of the cat as
dead,
|ψ〉 = α |χ〉+ β |θ〉 (2.3)
is a valid solution to the Schrödinger equation. Of course, we have |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, since the state
space of the cat has only two eigenstates, dead and alive. In the Copenhagen interpretation, we
have this cat being in an indeterminate state before observation, only “collapsing” into one of the
states after observation. Since cats (as far as my knowledge on feline creatures goes) are never
observed to be in such indeterminate states, we are uncertain about the interpretation of such a
state before the collapse. To say that the cat is both dead and alive seems to fly in the face of
experience, and claiming that the cat is of one state (either alive or dead) is incorrect, since we
could always disprove the statement given sufficient number of trials.8 Therefore, we can never be
certain about the individual outcomes of the each state.
To the practicing physicist, he may interpret equation (2.3) as the state with a probability |α|2
of being in the alive eigenstate, and probability of |β|2 of being in the dead eigenstate:
When an observation is made on any [system] that is in a given state, in general the
result will not be determinate, i.e. if the experiment is repeated several times under
identical conditions several different results may be obtained. It is a law of nature,
though, that if the experiment is repeated a large number of times, each particular result
will be obtained in a definite fraction of the total number of times, so that there is a
definite probability of its being obtained. (Dirac, 1930)
In other words, this textbook interpretation means that if we produce n identical copies of the state,
and subject all n copies to the experiment, n|α|2 will have the outcome of the cat being alive, and
n|β|2 will have the outcome of the cat being dead.9 This conventional interpretation fails in part
due to the explanation given in the previous paragraph, since probability for a single instance is
not well-defined, and in part due to effects of interference. Consider the time evolution of the state
|ψ〉:10
|χ〉 → 1√
2
(|χ〉+ |θ〉) (2.4)
8For example, the statement “The cat is alive.” could be falsified if the cat ends up being dead, and vice versa.
Given sufficient trials, the statement would be wrong.
9A 50-50 mixed state of |χ〉 and |θ〉 will also yield the same probabilities, but the density matrices are different.
From this, we are able to distinguish between pure states in a superposition with respect to a given eigenbasis, or a
mixed state.
10Such a time evolution is completely realistic and occurs, for instance, for a spin state precessing in a magnetic
field.
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|θ〉 → 1√
2
(|χ〉 − |θ〉) (2.5)
after time t, such that if the state was initially in |χ〉, we have a 50% probability of finding the
state in |χ〉 or in |θ〉 after time t. Same goes for the initial state being in |θ〉 (the negative sign
does not matter in the computation of probability, since we are taking the square of the absolute
value). Applying the same logic to |ψ〉, and letting α = β, we should expect a 50-50 outcome of
|χ〉 and |θ〉, if we were to simply “sum” the probabilities and normalize them. However, if we were
to apply linearity to |ψ〉, the state after time t becomes completely independent of |θ〉. Therefore,
with superposition, interference has reinforced the |χ〉 state and canceled out the |θ〉 state. This is
not a feature of classical probability, and so to view the coefficients as probability amplitudes is
problematic.
3 The Everett Interpretation
In July 1957, Hugh Everett III published the short form of his Princeton doctoral thesis in Reviews
of Modern Physics with the title of “Relative State” Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. The
critical part of his thesis lies in the following excerpt:
Throughout all of a sequence of observation processes there is only one physical system
representing the observer, yet there is no single unique state of the observer (which
follows from the representations of interacting systems). Nevertheless, there is a repre-
sentation in terms of a superposition, each element of which contains a definite observer
state and a corresponding system state. Thus with each succeeding observation (or
interaction), the observer state “branches” into a number of different states. Each branch
represents a different outcome of the measurement and the corresponding eigenstate for
the object-system state. All branches exist simultaneously in the superposition after
any given sequence of observations. The “trajectory” of the memory configuration of
an observer performing a sequence of measurements is thus not a linear sequence of
memory configurations, but a branching tree, with all possible outcomes existing
simultaneously in a final superposition with various coefficients in the mathematical
model. (Everett, 1957)
The Everett interpretation, is simply quantum mechanics taken literally. It retains the first two
axioms of quantum mechanics, and attempts to take the wavefunction as a literal description of
reality, with the Schrödinger equation as its unique evolution rule.11 The axiom on wavefunction
collapse is completely removed, and the implications will be discussed throughout this chapter.
Instead of interpreting the eigenstates as distinct outcomes with the coefficients acting as some
11Some consider this as an attempt to make quantum mechanics “self-interpreting”. Even though most of classical
mechanics do not need an interpretation, and are considered as self-interpreting, a literal interpretation cannot be
considered as self-interpreting, due to the complexities discussed in this paper.
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probability, Everett Quantum Mechanics (EQM) views those eigenstates as multiplicities. Let’s
return to the example of the famous but unfortunate cat.12 The space of all the possible states of
the cat is in the Hilbert space, denoted as Hcat. In this Hcat space, we can find our familiar cat in
all sorts of physical conditions, including the dead version. These macroscopic states are familiar to
us. However, this is only a small subspace – there are allowed states in the entire Hilbert space
that do not resemble our notion of cats at all. They are termed as “macroscopically indefinite”,
as compared to the “macroscopically definite” cats in the previous sentence. Conventionally, the
evolution of the cat state should result in one of these macroscopically indefinite states most of the
time, but this has never been observed. Our notion of cats is still very much in that restricted class.
Every single observation corresponds to our notion of the cat, and non-cats are never observed.
Therefore, at first glance, this interpretation of EQM seems patently invalid.
This is then very strange for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, since it does not match
our everyday experiences. In another approach, we could imagine constructing our Hcat by adding
fermions one by one. Hcat is therefore a tensor product of all the Hilbert spaces of constituent
particles. This composite Hilbert space could represent other “stuff” too, not only cats, as long
as they contain the same number of particles (or that the wavefunction exists in the same Hilbert
space). A cat, being in a superposition of being alive and dead is therefore a strange interpretation
of a macroscopically indefinite state, and to be more precise we should be adopting a language that
states this macroscopically indefinite state is a superposition of a dead cat and a live cat. This is
the literal interpretation of equation below:
|ψ〉 = α |live cat〉+ β |dead cat〉 . (3.1)
3.1 Decoherence
There is an obvious issue with this interpretation, since we do not observe superpositions of dead
cats and live cats. One possible resolution to this issue is decoherence. The state of superposition
will rapidly decohere into definite states in dynamically separated regions, or “worlds.”13 In many
worlds, the state will interact with the environment through entanglement and the state will lose its
coherence (or quantum phase) to the surrounding. Before decoherence, the reduced density matrix
corresponds to a pure state. Once we compute the reduced density matrix for the system after
decoherence, we get a reduced density matrix corresponding to a mixture of a live cat and a dead
cat. Using the Everett interpretation, we say that the mixed states correspond to two worlds.
The most direct reason we do not observe the alternate state of the cat is due to the idea that
we live in a different world from the other state. If we were to consider ourselves as quantum states
too,14 we are now in one of the following basis states:
12This example is from Wallace (2012).
13We use the terms “worlds” and “branches” interchangeably throughout this paper.
14One of Everett’s motivations for his theory was to create a consistent theory of quantum mechanics for cosmology.
The textbook view typically separates the experiment and the observer, but for cosmology, the observer is within the
experiment, and not external to it. For such a version of quantum mechanics to work, the natural extension is for the
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|ψ〉 = α |live cat〉 ⊗ |observer sees live cat〉+ β |dead cat〉 ⊗ |observer sees dead cat〉 . (3.2)
The above explanation deserves a more elaborate discussion. How and why is coherence lost,
from a carefully prepared quantum state? Firstly, let us consider an example that is common
in physics, that we have a photon hitting an atom in a superposition. The two states of the
superposition are orthogonal and each state describes the atom in a distinct location, and we can
write the wavefunction of the system as follows:
|ψbefore〉 =
[
α |ψx〉+ β |ψy〉
]
⊗ |k0〉 , (3.3)
where the first element of the tensor product describes the atom’s state and the second, the photon’s
state (which is characterized by its wavenumber, k). The incident photon can either hit the state
localized in position x, or the state localized in position y. The state of the photon changes after
the interaction with the atom, and we can denote the two different states as |kx〉 and |ky〉. With a
small assumption that the atom is very massive and there is negligible momentum change caused
by the scattering of the photon, our new state becomes:
|ψafter〉 =
[
α |ψx〉 ⊗ |kx〉
]
+
[
β |ψy〉 ⊗ |ky〉
]
. (3.4)
Now, we consider the partial trace of the density matrix over the photon, since we are concerned
about the state of the atom after the interaction. The partial trace is given by:
ργ =
(
|α|2 αβ∗ 〈ky|kx〉
α∗β 〈kx|ky〉 |β|2
)
. (3.5)
It is obvious that we are concerned about the absolute value of 〈kx|ky〉. If this product is close to
unity, then the atom is not affected at all, since the density matrix remains the same before and
after the scattering. This is, however, extremely unlikely, since the photon should be able to tell
us the definite location of the atom (instead of returning no information at all), in each branch.
〈kx|ky〉 is often called the amount of overlap between the two possible states, and a value close to
unity implies that the states are very similar. If the experiment was set up in such a way that the
wavelength of the photon is much shorter than the spatial separation between x and y, the photon
will be able to probe the difference between the two superposed states. As such, since we are able
to distinguish the two states of the photon, we should expect 〈kx|ky〉 to be far from unity. In fact,
this product could be made arbitrarily close to zero (by using photons with shorter wavelengths),
and we now see that the atom has assumed two distinct states, and the superposition evaporates.
We call the process decoherence. In a large system, with multiple atoms and photons scattering off,
the off-diagonal terms will go to zero much faster as a function of time, and we lose all the coherent
information about the atoms. This process is irreversible, and the information is irretrievably lost
to the environment.
observers to be part of the quantum system as well, hence this incorporation of observers into the wavefunction.
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Due to the general nature of decoherence, any interference experiment involving localized
wavepackets will be bound to fail, since we are unable to maintain states in coherent superpositions
for meaningful periods of time. In other words, with decoherence, the interference terms vanish.
This explains why we do not observe states of superposition in a single world.
3.2 Preferred Basis Problem
If we were to accept the branching version of quantum mechanics as true, then the question of the
preferred basis appears almost instantaneously. How do we define “worlds”, and what constitutes a
different world? The basis itself is arbitrary, as long as we have the required number of basis states
to span the Hilbert space. It seems that there is a preferred basis for branch-splitting, since we end
up with one basis state out of many, possibly infinite, states, in each branch. Mathematically, we
can have
|ψ〉 = α1 |ω〉+ β1 |δ〉 (3.6)
= α2 |χ〉+ β2 |θ〉 , (3.7)
where each pair of eigenstates is distinct from each other. Given the many ways to write superpo-
sitions, how can we explain the privileged status of the physically realized basis in each branch?
The problem of the preferred basis was attempted in the 1980s, notably by Deutsch (1985) and
Lockwood (1989), but such resolutions were not satisfactory. For further explorations, refer to
Foster and Brown (1988).
With the development of decoherence theory, we can always find a basis that the reduced density
matrix for the system is diagonalized, and therefore we are able to pick out that basis. We may
be concerned whether decoherence would pick that exact same basis all the time for an identical
system. The answer is not provided by decoherence, but the result that the same basis is picked out
is due to the locality of interactions. This is because for local interactions, only the pointer states
are stable under the continued monitoring (or interaction) by the environment, and the same pointer
states are chosen (Zurek, 1981, 1999, 2003). Further explanations and details on decoherence can
be found in Wallace (2012).
Our next trouble is that the most literal reading of quantum mechanics does not specify the
existence of “worlds”, nor define what a “world” is. It would do us no good to introduce the concept
of a world as one of the fundamental axioms, if we want to retain the simplicity of EQM. According
to Wallace, this question does not exist, since each world is an example of an emergent process,
much like how social behavior is emergent.
The branches which appear in decoherence are precisely the kind of entities that special
sciences in general tell us to take seriously. They are emergent, robust structures in the
quantum state, and as such, we have (it seems) as much reason to take them ontologically
seriously as we do any other such structure in science – such as those structures that
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we identify as chairs and tables, cats and gods and tigers. So – on pain of rejecting the
coherence of the special sciences as a whole – we should accept that unitary quantum
mechanics is already a many-words theory. (Wallace, 2012)
With ideas on decoherence and emergence, we can consider the preferred basis problem as solved.
However, others such as Kent (1990), Stapp (2002) and Schlosshauer (2004) disagree. For a more
complete discussion, refer to Wallace (2012).
4 Philosophical Perspectives on Everett Quantum Mechanics
Everett wrote:
We have, then a theory which is objectively casual and continuous, while at the same time
subjectively probabilistic and discontinuous. It can lay claim to a certain completeness,
since it applies to all systems, of whatever size, and is still capable of explaining the
appearance of the macroscopic world. The price, however, is the abandonment of the
concept of the uniqueness of the observer, with its somewhat disconcerting philosophical
implications. (1957)
The “disconcerting philosophical implications” involve a rejection of the classical reality. The version
of reality that most of us humans live with is a product of evolution over millions of years, and it
has served us well thus far. To abandon this version of reality is to question the fundamentals of
existence, and the primary motivation for this is not empirical evidence of the existence of the other
worlds, but for (supposed) physical completeness. Then again, the history of science has shown us
that our first ideas about what we observe are often wrong, i.e. reality to us has never been an a
priori knowledge. For example, it was intuitive to think that the Earth is flat, that the Sun goes
around the Earth, that time is absolute, that light is a wave, and then a particle, and then as a
duality. The point, therefore, is that we have no reason to think that our observation and experience
reflect reality.
There are philosophical merits to cutting down the number of seemingly ad hoc assumptions in
quantum mechanics, in accordance to Ockham’s razor, where we select the theory with the fewest
assumptions. However, Ockham’s razor is also the prima facie objection to the Everett program,
that we are making unnecessary assumptions about the existence of other worlds. In Paul Davies’
(1986) words, “So the parallel universes are cheap on assumptions but expensive on universes.” It
seems that a pursuit of the elegance from the assumption perspective has led us to another problem.
Wallace (2012) provides an analogy in cosmology: “[We] don’t tend to assume that cosmological
theories are a priori more or less likely to be true according to how many galaxies they postulate.”
Using that argument, there is no good reason for us to reject Everett quantum mechanics just
because it goes beyond a threshold size.
The idea that EQM is untestable, or using Karl Popper’s term “(un)falsifiable,” remains a valid
concern. It remains difficult to test the difference between conventional quantum mechanics and
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the Everett version. Various possibilities are explored in §10 of Wallace (2012). Although we may
never be able to directly probe the existence of parallel universes, we don’t seem to have similar
objections to the existence of quarks, for example. The existence of quarks is naturally inferred
from the features of quantum chromodynamics through deep inelastic scattering, just as we might
infer the existence of parallel universes from our consistent physical theories. To directly prove
the existence of quarks, we need to probe hadrons at energy and timescales inaccessible to us; to
prove the existence of other worlds, if EQM is valid, we need to note the value of a certain binary
outcome, travel backwards in time before the branching occurred, and compare notes. There may
be objections that these two scenarios are not exactly analogous, given that we are able to interact
directly with the hadrons and hence there is a causal connection between us, but there is none for
the other worlds. The counter argument would be that the causal interaction between us and quarks
is an indirect one, and the link between hadrons and quarks is a scientific theory. This scientific
link has the exact same ontological status as the one linking our the Everett interpretation to the
existence of many worlds.
Given physical limitations, we are currently prohibited from a direct verification.15 As such,
testing the existence of other worlds and quarks has the same problem, and since we do not question
the existence of quarks, it seems difficult to justify the doubts on the existence of other worlds.
One of the most philosophically elegant reasons to adopt EQM is the symmetry in equiprobable
outcomes. In a system with n equiprobable outcomes, there is no symmetry-breaking in EQM when
all outcomes are realized (in different, non-interacting worlds). Granted, such a physical system
is impossible to realize, due to our inability to conduct experiments in the complete absence of
(thermal, for instance) noise. One could argue that such a system is unphysical, but with EQM, we
do not need a symmetry breaking process attributed to a collapse into a random eigenstate, thus
removing the intrinsic randomness in the Copenhagen interpretation. If all outcomes are realized,
the continuous time evolution of the wavefunction is not interrupted if viewed along a continuous
branch. Since decoherence is continuous in time, the removal of the abrupt transition due to a
random process is physically, if not philosophically, elegant. This may satisfy Schrödinger in §2.1.
5 The Probability Problem
Before we delve into problems associated with probability, we need to state the role of probability
in science. There are two primary ways in which we use probabilities: firstly, we infer from our
collected data, answers about probabilities. Secondly, we use these probabilities to make decisions.
Wallace (2012) calls them the inferential link and the decision-theoretic link respectively. These two
ways in which probabilities are understood give rise to different interpretation of probabilities, each
with their own issues. The following chapters deal with the problems of probability specifically in
physics, and especially in EQM in the later parts.
15Yes, there may be a time when humans are able to directly probe the properties of quarks, but we do not have a
clear idea for the existence of other worlds. However, as the objection stands now, both quarks and other worlds are
features of current physical theories, and it makes little sense to take one’s existence more seriously over the other.
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In classical theories of physics, we are used to the concept of phase space. A phase space, when
referring to a dynamical system, describes a mathematical space that represents all possible states
of the system. Each unique configuration of the system is represented as a point in that space. For
example, having N particles in a system, with six degrees of freedom (three spatial, three rotational),
the phase space has 6N dimensions.
Probabilities in classical physics have an intuitive meaning: that is a measure over the phase
space, or possibility space. The probability of an outcome is therefore the ‘volume’ of the outcome
in phase space over the entire phase space. It is thus obvious that probability is expressed as a
simple ratio.
There are problems associated with this view, however. To compute this ratio, it means that
we must know the size of the phase space a priori. This difficulty is illustrated by a dice throw:
why do we assume that there are only six possible outcomes, and ignore the microscopic degrees
of freedom? Internal degrees of freedom are not well-understood, and we are treating each degree
of freedom on parity, when there may be an asymmetric field affecting certain (spatial) degrees of
freedom. In many cases, the phase space is infinite, if the possibilities are unbounded. As a purely
mathematical investigation, this looks disappointing. It turns out that a better way to figure out
the ratio is through empirical studies (Hájek, 2010).16
How then, do we empirically decide on the ratio? What is the probability that I would get a
“heads” on a fair coin?
I think there is no good response to the second question. This is because we do not know
a priori that our coin is a fair one, given a random coin. Assuming that we go on to test the
fairness of the coin, at what level do we decide that the coin is fair? The two common methods
to determine the fairness of a coin, the posterior probability density function and the estimator of
true probability methods, are based on Bayesian probability and the frequentist interpretation of
probability respectively. Both methods yield results at a certain confidence or truth level, and have
non-zero uncertainty. The next best way to ask the question is therefore, what is the probability
that I would get a “heads” on a probably fair coin?
I hope it is obvious to the reader now that there is no chance for us to get exactly P (heads) = 1/2.
The problem on deciding what a fair coin is circular. To test whether the coin is fair, we are basically
testing if the coin has equal chances as ending up “heads” or “tails.” But this assumes a certain
idea of probability in the first place, that to be fair is to have a probability of 1/2 for each outcome.
The general form of this issue is known as the equiprobable criterion.
A possible resolution to the circular argument is known as the principle of indifference. When
there is no evidence that skews one possibility from the other (a symmetric system), they have equal
probabilities. Even though this is a reliable principle for all practical purposes, this is an argument
from ignorance, such that absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence. Also, to appeal
to certain ideas of “indifference,” we are going back to operational ideas of probability, ending up in
circularity once again.
16This is an example of the frequentist interpretation.
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5.1 Probability in Classical Physics
When we look at possible outcomes, such as the example of the coin, we are using a classical
interpretation of probability. The frequentist idea is based on actual outcomes, and it is clear
that we are unable to extract irrational values of probability from finite realized outcomes. If we
were to consider the ideal limit of the frequentist interpretation, then we are missing the point of
defining probability operationally, for realized outcomes. Since frequentism is the most common
understanding of probability in the physical sciences, I will go into some detail of this interpretation
here. For a detailed discussion, refer to Hájek (2009).
The textbook case of probability is always described as some limiting relative frequency among
all possible outcomes, as the limit of trials tend to infinity. This is different from having an actual
infinity of trials, as a limiting frequency is physically realizable. A stricter definition is that the
divergence of the limiting frequency from some expected value that we deem as the probability
tends to zero as the number of trials tends to infinity. This statement may sound familiar, because
it is simply a restatement of the Law of Large Numbers, that almost guarantees the convergence of
the limiting frequency and the expected value. To use the limiting frequency to measure probability
presents no additional problem, but then it is not sure what “probability” really means. On the
other hand, if we were to define limiting frequency as probability, then we are led into a circular
argument. This is because convergence is not granted, but merely probable. Probability cannot
be defined as a probable process, so we still do not have a rigorous definition of probability using
common ideas of frequentism.
Another view of probability is based on the natural propensity of the system in question.
Karl Popper believed that the probability of each experimental outcome is directly related to the
propensity of the experiment in producing that result. Propensities explain the reason behind each
probability value, and may be valid for single-trial experiments. However, the exact definition of
propensity remains elusive.
The previous interpretations of probability are objective. An example of an interpretation that
is subjective is the Bayesian interpretation. The Bayesian interpretation considers varying degrees
of belief for independent observers, due to certain ideas on individual ignorance.
In the Bayesian approach, we can consider a game of betting. To distinguish this form of
Bayesian probability from other similarly named methods, we shall call it the rationalist approach,
as first suggested by Wallace (2012). For a simple die where there are six unique outcomes, a
rational bet is for the die landing on any one (fixed) position, at 5-1 odds. It would not be rational
for the participant to bet on worse odds – and we say that the participant has assessed that the
probability of the die landing on one specific outcome is 1/6. To be more precise, the criterion for
the probability (of an event E) being P is that is that a rational participant is willing to bet on it
at (1/P − 1):1 odds. In this approach, the betting preferences are not indications of what he thinks
the probabilities are; instead, his betting preferences define probability for him (Wallace, 2012). Of
course, the participant has to assign betting preferences that obey the probability calculus, else it is
definite that he would lose money if he were to accept those bets. For philosophical issues regarding
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Bayesian interpretation of philosophy, see Ramsey (1926) and Savage (1954).
5.2 Probability in Copenhagen Quantum Mechanics
Probability, in quantum mechanics, is given by the Born rule. It was once thought of as an axiom of
quantum mechanics, but recent efforts have been successful in proving that Born’s rule is actually a
feature of Hilbert space, or derivable in some other methods. Probability in quantum mechanics, as
we have seen from the interference example right at the start, does not follow classical probability
rules. This is sometimes referred to as quantum probability, with the corresponding logic structure
called quantum logic. Although the logical structure is different from the classical case, probability in
Copenhagen quantum mechanics is still well-defined, using a rather loose application of frequentism.
This has been championed by Hilary Putnam (1969), that we should be adopting an empiricist
approach to logic. Classical logic uses Boolean algebra, while quantum logic uses a more generalized
form of Boolean algebra. As a result, Putnam views quantum logic as a generalization of classical
logic, but then natural logic ceases to be a priori, and criticisms are abound. The most obvious
argument is that defining logic within a physical framework is circular, since the physical framework
has to be defined within a certain set of logic in the first place. For other arguments, see Stachel
(1986). Nevertheless, the fact that we require non-standard logic to describe quantum mechanics
presents a new set of problems when trying to interpret probabilities.
Chances of an event happening in classical mechanics and (Copenhagen) quantum mechanics
are however ontologically distinguished. As mentioned in §2.1, in classical mechanics, the system
evolves smoothly into the final state, but in quantum theory, there is a required act of observation
at an arbitrary time to confirm the final state. It thus seems that quantum mechanics is governed by
two sets of rules: the unitary time-evolution of the wavefunction given by the Schrödinger equation,
and then by a mysterious probabilistic process.
If this is the case, we are unable to point to the source of probability in the Copenhagen
interpretation. The collapse process obscures our understanding of the probabilistic “evolution” of
the wavefunction, since it disrupts the smooth, deterministic process of the Schrödinger evolution.
Although it is traditionally understood that the probabilities in classical and Copenhagen quantum
mechanics refer to the same concept,17 they may not be the case. In fact, even though the coefficients
or the amplitudes of the eigenstates are traditionally understood as being proportional to actual
probabilities, they may not be related to our notions of probabilities in classical mechanics. This is
where the Everett picture comes into play.
6 Probability in Everett Quantum Mechanics
Probability in Everett quantum mechanics remains as one of the most difficult problems in Everett’s
formulation, as at the heart of the theory, we are trying to remove the collapse postulate (and
17Of whichever favorite interpretation of probability. For example, using frequentism, the idea of probability is
the same in both cases – over the long run, we have specific relative frequencies of each outcome. When properly
normalized, we get the probabilities we commonly understand.
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hence the source of probability considerations in quantum mechanics). Problems on probability
are pervasive in many branches of physics, and we should take care not to demand universal
solutions, since we are concerned specifically about Everettian probability. Problems such as the
the issues contained in the frequentism approach affect physics as a whole, and are not unique to
Everett quantum mechanics, and therefore there will be little emphasis on these types of “universal”
problems. What I will focus on, is Everett-specific problems on probability, or if there is an idea of
probability in this theory at all, given our current understanding about probability.
The most outstanding problem on probabilities lies in the formulation of Everett quantum
mechanics – if all the outcomes are realized in a deterministic theory, then what do we mean by
chance (and probability)? Secondly, even if probability were to exist, where does Born rule enter
the game? This second question deals with the nature of branches (or worlds).
For the first question, the argument usually appeals to intuition: prima facie, probability requires
some uncertainty or alternative outcomes. However, it is not clear that probability must be defined
within the context of uncertainty and alternatives. It is perhaps a more generalized concept of
probability that we must consider. Tim Maudlin (2002) argues:
The many-worlds theory is incoherent for reasons which have often been pointed out: since
there are no frequencies in the theory there is nothing for the numerical predictions of
quantum theory to mean. This fact is often disguised by the choice of fortuitous examples.
A typical Schrödinger-cat apparatus is designed to yield a 50 percent probability for
each of two results, so the ‘splitting’ of the universe in two seems to correspond to
the probabilities. But the device could equally well be designed to yield a 99 percent
probability of one result and 1 percent probability of the other. Again the world splits
in two; wherein lies the difference between this case and the last?
If that were truly the case, then we should assume that probability no longer plays a role in EQM,
since the values for probability are arbitrary. Probability is most often used to model chances for each
particular outcome – if the outcomes are symmetric in every case irrespective of the probabilities,
then the idea of probability seems superfluous.
Of course, we could choose the word “probability” to refer exclusively to the form of uncertainty
regarding outcomes, but the motivation behind seems to be arbitrary, since we do not have a priori
reasons to define probability only within the context of uncertainty. Probability in science seems to
mean something physical, and does not allow for the arbitrariness involved. Therefore in such cases,
we are not precluded from talking about probabilities in the absence of alternative outcomes. In
fact, we have no evidence that actual probability means probability only in cases with alternatives.
The only reason we are trying to resurrect some ideas of probability in Everett quantum mechanics
is empirical verification. “[It] is incumbent upon the Everettian to provide an interpretation in
which the statistical analysis of the outcomes of repeated experiments provides empirical support for
the theory.” (Greaves & Myrvold, 2008) For example, Young’s double slit experiment and quantum
tunneling in radioactivity processes are well-known examples involving probability in quantum
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mechanics.18 Since we need a theory to explain these phenomena, it makes sense for us to adopt (at
least functionally) the idea of probability.
Take the case of quantum tunneling in radioactivity for example. Once we remove the collapse
postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation, and introduce the Everett interpretation, and if the
Everett interpretation is correct, every single case of decay reflects branching. We have a Poisson
distribution for the probability of a given number of decays, given an average rate of decay. Using
the Everett interpretation, we need to obtain this Poisson distribution as well, since we view this
Poisson statistics as being objective reality. Therefore, we need probability in EQM for general
agreement with experiments.
We know (or we think we know) from quantum mechanics that each eigenstate is a distinct
physical possibility, so the realization of each eigenstate to observers must follow some ideas of
“probability.” Probability, in this sense, is a very general idea. Perhaps we are concerned about
retrieving the Born rule, or for us to simply explain the coefficients of the eigenstates. If we agree
with Everett’s branching program, and take Wallace’s ideas on decoherence and emergence to form
new branches, and see that there is a coefficient attached to each branch, what is our most immediate
response? That these coefficients are branch modifiers, and they somehow relate to our real-world
experiments in terms of probabilities. Probability thus should be related to branch coefficients (or
the absolute square of the coefficients, known as branch weights). It may then be that these branch
weights create the illusion of chancy events.
Vaidman (2011), among others, suggested that probability stems from a version of self-locating
uncertainty. In an experiment with three equiprobable outcomes, the uncertainty is not about the
outcome, but about the location in the universe of the observer (since he could be in any one of
the three worlds in the universe). If that is correct, then the concept of probability has shifted
from pre-experiment to post-experiment. Albert (2010) disagreed with this concept of probability,
claiming that probability enters too late. Vaidman’s response (2011) is such that Albert is appealing
to the standard version of probability,19 and not the generalized version that we have discussed
previously. In the generalized form of probability, we might not care when probability enters the
experiment.
It should be clear that the traditional notions on probability are not sufficiently robust in the
context of the Everett interpretation. Despite that, we need to retain the most general aspects
of probability due to experimental verification. Once we allow the use of such general ideas on
probability, we may also be open to the idea of decision theory forming the basis of probability.
This will be discussed in-depth in §§ 6-7.
18The use of probability in the sentence seems to be circular. It is not – we could use another word for probability,
and return to find an explanation for it. If one rejects the calling of it as probability, then we are arguing about the
definition of probability, and we return to the first objection on probability.
19As used in standard scientific literature to model uncertain outcomes.
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6.1 Nature of Branching
Although we know that we ought to derive Born rule from the postulates of EQM, it is not
immediately clear how this could be done. We have assumed that the branches occur spontaneously
during a measurement, and that each branch or world is an emergent entity. We may know how a
branch is formed, but there are several arguments on the number of pre-existing branches and future
branches. Is the number of branches infinite? If so, is it a countable infinity, or uncountable infinity?
There are also issues on the time dependence of branches – does the number of branches change, or
does it remain constant? Although we are not concerned with the exact number of branches20, we
are concerned about properties of the branching structure, since it gives us clues to relate branch
weights and probability.
David Deutsch saw the number of branches21 being infinite, but the number of them remain
constant in time. He understood the branching situation as:
In my favorite way of looking at this, there is an infinite number of [universes] and this
number is constant; that is, there is always the same number of universes. Before a
choice or decision is made, in which more than one outcome is possible, all the universes
are identical, but when the choice is made, they partition themselves into two groups,
and in one group one outcome happens and in the other group another outcome happens.
(Davies, 1986)
This viewpoint circumvents the requirements of decoherence and emergence, and assumes right at
the start there is an infinite number of universes.22 Since there is an infinite number of universes,
and the number is constant,23 we do not have to worry about the creation of new universes through
mechanisms such as decoherence and emergence. Each universe (or branch) evolves independently24
and for there to be two sets of outcomes, there needs to be two sets of observers before the observation.
The objection is therefore straightforward: this is seemingly no different from living in a single
universe, with a single-world interpretation of quantum mechanics, since we could say that we are
living in one (and the same) universe out of the infinite number of universes.
For example, imagine toy universes with only one fundamental particle, with two possible and
equiprobable states after decaying from an initial state. If the number of such universes is infinite
and constant, then we should expect two groups of universes, each with one of the two final states
of the particle. If we track the evolution of one of these universes, we see one particle decaying into
one of the two final states, in a random fashion. As we survey increasingly more universes, the
statistics work out to 50-50, satisfying the equiprobable condition. Therefore, there is no difference
20This will be tackled later in the text.
21To be exact, he makes references to universes, but the argument runs in the same way.
22The use of “universe” here is not the same as “worlds” or “branches”. In modern interpretations of EQM, branches
or worlds are emergent entities within one single universe.
23Infinity being “constant” is mathematically imprecise, but I assume an unchanging number of universes.
24The universes do not interact with each other under most circumstances, but such interactions are not precluded
under Deutsch’s model.
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between this and the Copenhagen view, only that the frequentist collection of statistics is done
across different universes, and not identical particles in one universe. This view could be described
as Copenhagen with other worlds, but is distinct from the current formulation of EQM due to the
lack of a branching structure.
The assumption of infinite universes at t0 is another problem by itself. The mathematics of
quantum mechanics does not mention anything about the infinities of universes, as equation (3.1)
suggests only branching. This assumption then would have to be added as one of the axioms of
quantum mechanics, which deviates from the current work in Everett quantum mechanics.
If we were to adopt the idea that EQM is quantum mechanics taken literally, we will consider
that branching is real, and the number of branches increases. The universe began with one universal
wavefunction, and branching thereafter lead us into the present. I will argue that the number of
branches in the universe is increasing, but we do not have a discrete branching process. David
Wallace (2012) argued this case as:
[Everywhere], there is branching. Furthermore, there is no sense [for] a naturally discrete
branching process: as we have seen in studying quantum chaos, while a branching
structure can be discerned in such systems, it has no natural ‘grain.’ To be sure, by
choosing a certain discretization of (configuration-)space and time, a discrete branching
structure will emerge, but a finer or coarser choice would also give branching. And
there is no ‘finest’ choice of branching structure: as we fine-grain our decoherent history
space,25 we will eventually reach a point where interference between branches ceases
to be negligible, but there is no precise point where this occurs. As such, the question
‘How many branches are there?’ does not, ultimately, make sense.
The main mechanism behind branching is decoherence, and from the argument above, we end up
with an indefinite branch number due to the lack of a natural grain. However, this does not preclude
an increase in the number of branches even though we are not able to explicitly count them. To be
precise, then, we say that each branch is now mapped onto n branches, where n ≥ 1, even though n
is not well-defined or indeterminate.26 If we change the decoherence basis by just a small bit, n
may vary wildly.
Even though that is the case, we may be tempted to say that branches are continuous instead
of discrete. If the branches be denoted by (positive) real numbers, there will be two non-identical
numbers (denoting two different branches), and yet be within an  neighborhood as  → 0. If
branches are continuously differentiated from each other, we must come to the conclusion that the
branch number is infinite.27 This is also uncountably infinite.
25A decoherent history space is a set of disjoint exhaustive history that satisfy some decoherence condition.
26While there is no discrete branching process, if we were to take that the realist approach that each branch is real,
then the branches themselves are discrete.
27Assuming that space is continuous, we can map each point in space to a real number (to be exact, a tuple of real
numbers). The real number line is continuous and dense everywhere, and so if we were to define a position basis, we
should have infinite branches.
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However, if we are concerned about the probability in Everett quantum mechanics, we only worry
about distinct branches. We may have an uncountably infinite number of branches after the evolution
of the universal wavefunction, but since we do not make a distinction between branches in which we
cannot tell the difference qualitatively, we will work only with distinct, discrete branches, leading to
at most a countably infinite case. At any rate, we are concerned with assigning probabilities to the
distinct outcomes or events, where these are simply sets of elementary possibilities. This leads us to
an effective way to group branches together, and we end up, as agreed, with discrete possibilities.
6.2 Frequentism in EQM
All the discussion about the nature of branches has led to a tempting conclusion: we are able to
have frequentist ideas to count branches, even if the number of branches is not well-defined. Since
this idea is so appealing on an intuitive level, I will briefly discuss it. The key observation is that
if all the branches show approximately the correct28 statistics, then the mod-squared amplitudes
could be inferred from these values (Wallace, 2012).
In Everett’s original paper, he suggested that the combined mod-squared amplitudes which
do not agree with our theoretical predictions will tend to zero (Everett, 1957). This is based on
his typicality argument. In Everett’s relative state formulation, the mod-square of the coefficient
of each relative state is a measure for the typicality of branches, and the dynamics in the these
typical branches follow the observed quantum statistics. Atypical branches do not follow the correct
statistics, but they also have low branch coefficients. Geroch (1984) made a similar proposal, that
regions of Hilbert spaces that contain branches with anomalous statistics should be excluded from
analysis.
Again, Wallace (2012) makes an insightful remark: this is again circular, since it does not prove
that mod-squared amplitude equals relative frequency, but only that mod-squared amplitude equals
relative frequency with high mod-squared amplitude. This is exactly the same argument against
frequentism, where we used ideas about probability to define itself. This is a feature (or a bug?) of a
class of ideas based on the Weak Law of Large Numbers. The law states that if the probability of an
event is p, then we can always find a certain large number of trials necessary to get the probability
that the proportion of the event happening differs from p by more than a fixed amount δ is always
less than , for any δ and . Since the “proportion of the event happening” in the law is related to
probability, we are trapped in this circularity the moment we use such ideas.
Besides being circular, selecting only typical branches/typical regions of the Hilbert space seems to
be cherry-picking, since EQM does not prescribe such a selection rule.The atypical branches/regions
should not be excluded, since all branches/regions are equally realized in EQM and hence are actual
branches/regions, irrespective of the weights. The justification is not clear for precluding these
branches or regions of Hilbert spaces just because they have low weights and do not follow the
correct statistics. It may be justifiable if these branches/regions are known a priori, but since they
are not, it seems that the approach was theorized to shoehorn into agreement with experiments.
28Where correct refers to the statistics predicted by conventional quantum mechanics.
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Wallace (2012) put forth an argument that suggests that there may be no branches that do not
obey the correct statistics. If the branch structure is due to decoherence, and that the branches are
(approximately) orthogonal, at the emergent level, there should be no “anomalous” branches. Each
branch is produced through the same process and is thus just as physical as the next branch. This
means that we are taking all branches into consideration, as opposed to the previous approaches.
This approach is more likely to be valid as a priori we should be considering all branches, i.e. there
are no wrong branches.
Another approach is from Farhi, Goldstone and Gutmann (1989). As opposed to the attempts by
Everett, who considered a large but finite number of trials, Farhi et al. considered an actual infinity
of trials. This is quite a logical move to circumvent the circularity with defining “mod-squared
amplitude equals relative frequency with high mod-squared amplitude”. This approach is based
on the Strong Law of Large Numbers,29 which allows for a definitive statement involving actual
infinities. The Strong Law states that the set of all sequences whose limiting relative frequency of
an event happening is p has probability of measure one, and the proportion of the event happening
is indeterminate or different from p has the probability of measure zero. As a result of that, Farhi et
al. claim that the quantum state is a superposition of states in each of which the relative frequency
matches the predicted probability. That is, a proof of
F (θi) |ψ〉∞ = pi |ψ〉∞ (6.1)
is presented, where F (θi) is the frequency operator, |ψ〉∞ represents an infinite number of copies of
|ψ〉, and pi = |〈θi|ψ〉|2. The probability pi is therefore the eigenvalue of the frequency operator F (θi),
and the relationship is exact (cf. Everett’s approach). Caves and Schack (2005) argued against this
due to the non-uniqueness of the Hilbert space, leading to different frequencies depending on the
Hilbert space used. We should expect the frequencies to be Hilbert space independent, and such a
result from Farhi et al does not work for our purpose. The more obvious objection is such that we
should be able to find a way without using an actual infinity of trials, as such an attempt removes
the relationship between experimental verification and theory.
More generally, the motivation for frequentism fails completely when we consider trials with
limited number of runs. Such trials occur routinely in cosmology, for example. There are also times
in which we are concerned with the first n trials – in fact we can argue that we are only concerned
with only the first n trials all the time. Lastly, if we are concerned with only the first n trials, then
the probability given by frequentism does not help us at all, since in this case probability is only
well-defined for an arbitrarily large (or infinite) number of trials.
As we see, many of the problems of frequentism in EQM actually stem from the problems of
frequentism itself, and these problems are nowhere unique to the Everett program.
29The Strong Law implies the Weak Law.
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6.3 Bayesian Approach in EQM
The Bayesian approach,30 which has been described above for the classical case, is a subjective
approach. Subjective probability means that the probability is not defined for a physical system
in general, but only defined for a system for a specific agent. In the Everett program, after a
measurement is made of a wavefunction in N superposition states, we end up with N distinct
branches. The difference between the Bayesian approach in a one world scenario and in the Everett
world is that the payoffs for the agent in the game apply differently for each future version of him,
and hence when placing the bet, the agent is buying payoffs selectively. Despite this difference, the
definition of probability in this context is exactly the same across both cases. His successors receive
a certain amount of money according to the initial bet, and if the bets are not devised according to
probability calculus, all his successors would, on average, lose money.31 It is wise to give the last
statement a closer look, with the meaning of “average.” Such an average could be given by some
function of the utility in a particular branch and the branch weight,32 in which we usually term
weighted average. The branch weight is the mod-squared amplitude of the eigenstate, which agrees
with our usual computation of the weighted average.
According to Wallace (2012), the agent cares about all his outcomes because “[the] future self
is [his] future self just by virtue of the causal, structural, dynamical relations between it and the
agent’s past self.” Wallace assumes that all the future versions of the agent stem continuously from
the past self, and that the only way for this bet to follow probability calculus is that each version of
the agent matters to the initial agent. How much the agent should care is perhaps encapsulated
in the “caring measure”, advocated by Vaidman (2002) and Greaves (2004), which is once again
related to the branch weight (and hence probability).
6.4 Objective Probability in Physical Systems in EQM
It is unclear to us that, for the same physical system, there ought to be subjective probabilities. Yet,
if the probabilities reflect the preferences of agents, then it seems that we cannot avoid subjective
judgments. From physical laws, we understand that there are probabilities that do not change
according to observers, and it is useful for us to define a concept of objective probability.
The subjective probabilities are sometimes referred to as credences, which are degrees of belief of
a statement being true. Objective probabilities, or chances, underlie some measurements of physical
systems, and they are the values of probabilities that we get in quantum experiments.
Given these two ideas on probabilities and if we assume that at least one of them is true, we are
led naturally to one of the following three outcomes:
30Wallace refers to this approach as “rationalist”
31This is also known as a Dutch book. The proof could be found in Ramsey (1926).
32We may be using some form of the Born rule, and thus getting the average from the utility multiplied by the
mod-squared amplitude of each branch. Note that if we were to prove that the Bayesian approach provides us with
the right probabilities (that is, a proof of the Born rule), then this averaging would have to be carefully examined
using other axioms and assumptions besides the Born rule in order for us not to enter a circular argument.
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• All probabilities are subjective; the objective probabilities that we attempt to measure is
nothing more than a collective agreement.
• All probabilities are objective; the subjectivity is only superficial – given the same access to
information, rational agents will agree on the probabilities.
• Subjective and objective probabilities are distinct, but related.
Adopting the first viewpoint forces us to reject ideas about scientific realism, that there is a
fundamental objective reality beyond what we can perceive. In the context of discussing Everett
quantum mechanics, the rejection of realism is unfeasible since EQM assumes an objective reality at
the fundamental level.
The second viewpoint is also known as “objective Bayesianism.” This requires additional
constraints beyond that of probability calculus in order to achieve agreement between two agents.
With identical physically relevant information, they will agree on the same probability function.
The third possibility is also known as the Lewisian dualism viewpoint (1980). The dualism
permits one to acknowledge the existence of both forms of probability. One may see the objective
probability serving as a guide to a subjective, personal probability. However, as long as we do not
know the objective probabilities a priori, then it is not clear how our subjective probabilities could
be guided. Lewis (1980) introduced a Principal Principle, which is given the following definition:
For any real number x, a rational agent’s personal probability of an event E conditional
on the objective probability of E being x, and on any other background information, is
also x. (Wallace 2012)
This principle links subjective probability to objective probability. For example, if there is a 30%
credence on my part that I believe that a die is fair, and a 70% credence that the die is loaded to
always give three. Using the Principal Principle, the personal probability of the die showing three,
conditional on the die being loaded, is 1, and the personal probability of the die showing three,
conditional on the die being fair, is 1/6. Therefore, the personal probability of the die showing a
three is (0.7× 1 + 0.3× 1/6) = 0.75. The Principal Principle therefore relates subjective/personal
probabilities and objective probabilities (the 1 and 1/6 in the example).
The Principal Principle works in the context of frequentism as well. Suppose that C denotes my
current beliefs before the experiment, and P is the personal probability function.33 My personal
probability in a hypothesis H is therefore P (H|C). Let Xp be the hypothesis that we have an
objective probability p to get a particular outcome in the same experiment, and Yi be the proposition
that the ith trial that gives us that particular outcome. Using the Principal Principle, P (Yi|XpC) = p.
Let KM denote the proposition that the experiment yields the particular result in M out of N trials.
Therefore, we have
P (KM |XpC) =
(
N
M
)
pM (1− p)N−M . (6.2)
33Argument adapted from Wallace (2012).
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For large N, we can use the Central Limit Theorem and approximate the above binomial distribution
to the normal distribution:
P (KM |XpC) ' 1√2piNp(1− p) exp
[
− N2p(1− p)(M/N − p)
2
]
. (6.3)
Using the updating rules for conditional probabilities, we have
P (Xp|KMC) = P (KM |XpC)P (Xp|C)
P (KM |C) , (6.4)
and unless p is close to M/N , as N →∞, the personal probability for Xp given KM will be very
small. With an increasing number of trials, the agent employing the Principal Principle will be
increasingly more confident that the observed relative frequencies is close to the objective probability.
Therefore, this links the inferential link and the decision-theoretic link in § 5.
Using the Principal Principle, we are able to reconcile both notions of probabilities in the dualist
approach. The Principal Principle can be used to establish a functional definition of objective
probability, because it states the requirements of an objective probability, and the decision theory
form of subjective probability fits those requirements. However, even with this functional definition,
it is unclear what objective probability is.
If we were to assume a realist approach to probability, and assert that probability is as fun-
damental as fundamental quantities in the universe, such as charge or mass, and it exists as a
irreducible notion, then a functional definition would suffice. However, the assertion that objective
probability exists on the same ontological footing as other fundamental quantities seem misaligned.
This is because probability is not defined for a physical object, but for an event involving the
physical object. Such events relate to the measure over the set of all objects, since probabilities
relate the the properties of all possible worlds (van Fraassen, 1980). A second issue involves the
law of probability. If the concept of charge is irreducible, then we are required to take Maxwell’s
equations as fundamental. Similarly, to take probability as irreducible means we are taking the
Principal Principle as fundamental. To accept such a rationality-based principle as fundamental is
strange (Wallace, 2012).
The alternative is to use a separate concept from the Principal Principle to arrive at objective
probabilities being irreducible. In Everett quantum mechanics, we could claim that probabilities stem
from the branch weights. A physical quantifier for branch weight is probability, since probability has
the right properties to describe the branch weight. The branching structure is another physical entity
in the universe, and features of such a branching structure conform to our use of probability.34 With
this definition, we return to the Principal Principle after showing that these objective probabilities
are irreducible. Vaidman (2002) and Greaves (2004) suggest that we should take the Principal
Principle as basic (as in a basic physical law), but we could do better than this by using the essence
of the Principal Principle to derive the Born rule. If the Born rule can be recovered through
rationality axioms, then it grants such rationality requirements as fundamental.
34This sidesteps the point of whether branch weights are probabilities, but merely fulfills the role played by
probability in the branching structure. It is a functional definition after all.
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7 Probability Through Decision Theory
As the original proof of Gleason’s theorem is quite involved, we shall simply skip to the central
result:
All probability measures that can be defined on the lattice of quantum propositions
from the quantum statistical operators, that is all quantum probabilities, are of the
form P (Pi) = tr(ρPi), for some statistical operator ρ on Hilbert space H, for all H of
dimension of at least three. (Gleason, 1957)
Unless otherwise noted, P shall always denote probability, and Pi represents the projection operator.
The quantum statistical operators here are defined to be self-adjoint, or Hermitian, so ρ represents
the density operator. We know that tr(ρPi)= 〈ψ|Piψ〉, which is the Born rule.
Therefore, we have a mathematical explanation behind Born rule, instead of merely a postulate.
Since Gleason’s theorem lends support to verify the accuracy of the Born rule, any successful attempt
to recover probabilities from axioms of quantum mechanics must be able to reproduce the exact
probabilities given by the Born rule. This rules out derivations with arbitrarily close probabilities
to those predicted by the Born rule.
7.1 Decision-Theoretic Strategy
For the decision-theoretic method to work, we naturally have to obtain probabilities given by the
Born rule, as discussed. In this method, probability is derived from rational decision making, and
the agent who is aware that the Born rule weight of an outcome is p must act rationally as if the
probability is p (Wallace, 2012). A definition of probability p in the branching structure is the ratio
of the weights of branches containing that particular outcome, wX , normalized to the branch weight
of which the current agent is on, w0. In short, p is a ratio wX/w0. This strategy was originally
developed by Deutsch (1999), and refined by Wallace (2003, 2007).
7.2 Derivation of Born Rule Using Decision Making
This derivation follows closely from Deutsch (1999). For Wallace’s (2012) derivation, refer to
Appendix I.
For such a derivation to be successful, we should be able to retrieve an equivalent value of
the probability given by the mod-squared amplitude, without the use of any “mod-squaring.” A
decision-theoretic approach means that we need the various axioms and propositions in decision
theory to derive the Born rule. To understand their model, we have to go through a few simple
axioms of decision theory first, followed by the propositions.
Firstly, if there are two mutually-exclusive options, it is rational that we choose the option with
the higher payoff. Secondly, if two options give the same payoff, we are going to be indifferent.
Thirdly, if there are two options, the first being that we play two games with a certain payoff in total,
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and the second being that we play only one game with the same payoff, we should be indifferent.
Now, we are ready for the derivation of the Deutsch-Wallace model.
Suppose that we have a quantum wavefunction, in a superposition of two basis states, |x〉 and |y〉.
These two basis states are equally likely to occur, so we place the same value as their coefficients,
which has to be 1/
√
2. Therefore, the objective is to obtain probabilities of 1/2 for each outcome,
without using this probability rule, but with decision theory. Next, for mathematical simplicity, let
the value of each outcome be the value itself. For example, if the outcome is 5, then the value to
the observer is also 5. We thus want to show that the value of the superposition state is half (that
is the square of 1/
√
2) of x+ y. Mathematically, we want
V
[
1√
2
(
|x〉+ |y〉
)]
= 12
(
x+ y
)
, (7.1)
where V is the value function.
The first proposition in decision theory that we need is related to the zero-sum game. Given a
game with a certain set of possible payoffs, the value of playing another game with precisely negative
payoffs is the negative value of the original game. Mathematically, the equation is given as follows:
V
[
1√
2
(
|−x〉+ |−y〉
)]
= −V
[
1√
2
(
|x〉+ |y〉
)]
. (7.2)
The second proposition is something that we may be familiar with: if we take a game and
increase every possible payoff by a fixed amount k, the value is the same as playing the original
game, then receiving the additional payoff k. Mathematically, we have
V
[
1√
2
(
|x+ k〉+ |y + k〉
)]
= V
[
1√
2
(
|x〉+ |y〉
)]
+ k. (7.3)
Now consider the case where k = −x− y. We have the equation now as
V
[
1√
2
(
|−x〉+ |−y〉
)]
= V
[
1√
2
(
|x〉+ |y〉
)]
− x− y. (7.4)
This means that the value of the game with the reversed payoffs is equal to the value of the game
with the original payoffs, minus x, minus y. Since the value of the game with the reversed payoffs is
equal to the negative value of the game with the original payoffs (equation 7.2), we have
−V
[
1√
2
(
|x〉+ |y〉
)]
= V
[
1√
2
(
|x〉+ |y〉
)]
− x− y. (7.5)
Simple rearranging yields
V
[
1√
2
(
|x〉+ |y〉
)]
= 12
(
x+ y
)
,
which is our desired outcome.
This is but a simple example, and the general case can be easily proved if one works through the
mathematics (see Deutsch, 1999). Notice that the above derivation does not include probabilities,
only expected values. The point is that the rational agent would behave as though she has probability
p, through her expected value.
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8 Evaluation of the Decision-Theoretic Model
The above proof was first motivated by David Deutsch (1999), and further developed by David
Wallace (2012), and although we are getting the correct probabilities from this derivation, one may
argue against the axioms contained within the proof. I will now attempt to list the alternatives,
and evaluate them with respect to the decision-theoretic model. Terms used that are not previously
defined are available in Wallace’s derivation, available in the Appendix.
8.1 Naïve Branch Counting
This alternative is by far the most common, and in fact it has been (partly) addressed before. The
justification for branching counting is that since each branch represents a distinct version of me, and
since each copy does not care about the weight of the branch ‘I’ am currently on,35 we should assign
identical weights to every copy of me, leading to a 1/N probability, whereN is the number of branches.
A1
A2
Outcome α
Outcome β
Outcome γ
Figure 1: The Sleeping Beauty Problem
Wallace (2012) argued that this scheme is incon-
sistent, due to a version of the Sleeping Beauty
problem. There are two branching actions, A1
and A2 (as shown in Fig. 1), and both of them
are of binary outcomes. A2 only occurs in the
one of the A1 branches, and we have three dis-
tinct outcomes. Assuming that the branch of
A1 that leads into A2 has a specific reward,
such that β = γ, the agent should be indifferent
about those two outcomes. In fact, in this case,
we could say that the reward is given out right
before A2. Therefore, the version of the agent that lands on this branch does not care if A2 actually
occurs, due to branch indifference (the reward is already there for him). However, the probabilities
of getting to β (or γ, since β = γ) may not be well-defined: one could adopt the “Halfer” or the
“Thirder” position, that the reward occurs 1/2 of the time due to A1, or it occurs 2/3 of the time,
since there are two out of three branches with the reward.
This concern is valid, since there are arguments for both positions within EQM. Sebens and
Carroll (2015) argued that since the two branches that lead to outcomes β and γ have equal weights,
and that A1 splits into two branches with equal weights, then the probability of getting the reward
associated with β (or γ) is 1/2. Simple branch counting will give us a probability of 2/3 of getting
the reward, as mentioned above. Wallace uses this example to illustrate the hopelessness of simple
branching counting, since paradoxes like this are aplenty.
Even if this is so, Wallace (2012) is concerned about the indefinite nature of the number of
branches. The reasons for the indefinite nature have been enumerated previously, the chief reason
being that the number of branching depends on our choice of “grain.” However, I do not think that
35This is because to each person on a branch, his branch weight is simply 1.
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this the best argument for Wallace. Firstly, just because the choice of grain is arbitrary at the
moment, it does not mean that a unique grain does not exist. Secondly, while it may be impossible
to define the exact number of branches a priori, there should be a way to define it a posteriori. To
be precise, we are considering distinct macrostates with different reward subspaces. Since this is a
well-defined quantity as the agent is fully aware of these distinct subspaces, we do know something
about the relevant branching structure. From diachronic consistency, the agent must know the
structure before the measurement. It is true that the agent only cares about the relative branch
weights,36 but it seems incorrect that we are unable to extract an absolute branch weight. If we
return to Wallace’s argument that branch number fluctuates wildly depending on the level of grain
of our basis, we cannot expect that the number to fluctuate even after a basis is selected and
decoherence has happened. If that was indeed the case, then we would be speaking of “There is
a 20% probability that there are going to be 48 branches, 40% probability of 96 branches, and
40% probability of having 6 branches,” which does not make sense in a realist view, even if the
decision-theoretic model works.
Adrian Kent (2010) argued against this fuzzy scheme:
There is, on Wallace’s account, no precise fact of the matter about the different qua-
siclassical states that would result after a bet on a quantum experiment, nor about
Born weights of the branches corresponding to those quasiclassical states. And this isn’t
merely because quantum theory doesn’t supply a unique natural definition of elementary
branches and branching events: the total Born weight of all the quasiclassical branches
describing a spin-up outcome of a Stern-Gerlach experiment isn’t precisely defined either.
The total Born weight of Kent’s argument refers to an absolute (compared to relative) weight of
a particular outcome. Since Wallace is effectively sidestepping the issue by only defining relative
weights. the physical status of the branching structure is unclear. We may know the process of
decoherence, but is there ultimately a definite structure after the process?
Perhaps there is a way out for Wallace, by showing that each decoherence process leads to
infinite number of branches.37 For infinite branches, we could still consider the distinctive branches
and compute probabilities from there. However, it is not clear how we would end up with infinite
branches, or if this leads to positing an excess of branches, given that there has to be an infinite
number of branches corresponding to each distinct outcome.
8.2 Assigning Different Branch Weights
David Albert (2010) and Adrian Kent (2010) both put forward arguments that each agent in a
branch should not be weighted equally. Albert’s (tongue-in-cheek) argument is that for a branch
with more physical matter of ourselves (i.e., “fatter”), we should be more concerned about that
36The agent is concerned with the relative weights because he conditions his probabilities on occuring on the current
branch he is on. Due to the probability measure, we need to normalize the branch weights. The branch weights are
thus defined up to a multiplication factor.
37It does not matter if the infinities are countable or uncountable, assuming the continuum hypothesis.
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branch, since there is “more” of ourselves. Kent’s argument is that for someone who is more “aware”
in a branch, we should consider that branch as being more “real”, and hence assign a greater weight
to it. Therefore, while Albert focuses on the physical being, Kent focuses on the cognitive aspect.
Wallace (2012) argues against these ideas because they violate diachronic consistency. There
are conflicts (or differences) of interests at different stages of the agent’s life, and rational action
becomes ill-defined over long time scales. For example, before branching, the agent is indifferent to
putting on weight because he remains on the same branch while putting on weight.38 However, he
wants the copy of him on favorable branches to gain weight. Once his future self in on that branch,
he is indifferent with gaining weight, following the original indifference argument. This change in
preference removes the invariance of expected utility in time. A similar response applies to the state
of consciousness.
The problem with this is that for Wallace’s arguments to be valid (with Albert and Kent’s
concepts violating consistency), there has to be a certain version of free will involved, and changing
body weight (or state of conscious) has to be a personal decision.39 If such changes in state are the
result of the measurement (that results in branching) itself, then the argument from inconsistency
fails. For example, if we have an experiment that measures the spin of an electron, and if the spin
turns out to be +1, the appetite control section of the brain fails, and if the spin turns out to be -1,
then nothing happens. In such a case, would (or should) the agent place equal weights on the two
branches?
For an agent who maximizes his utility according to Wallace and Deutsch’s model of decision
making, it seems that the agent should apply different weights to the two branches described above.
Despite the inability for us to quantify consciousness,40 it is reasonable for us to assign different
weights to branches. This is best illustrated with an example: suppose both outcomes are of the
agent winning the million-dollar lottery, but in one outcome, the agent is fully lucid, while in the
other branch, the agent is sedated. It is thus rational to place a higher weight on the first outcome.
Despite that, we note that while assigning weights, we are assuming that the agents in the future
branches have an identical utility function.41 The conclusion is uncertain; we may end up with
different weights after all, but we may end with the same weights regardless of the level of fatness
or consciousness due to a corresponding shift in the utility function.
An astute reader would object to the above argument: you are conflating ideas about branch
weights and the utility! In the above example, it seems that the difference in consciousness should
factor into the utility, and not the branch weight. For a difference in consciousness, there is naturally
going to be a different utility level. In fact, the class of arguments made by Albert and Kent relates
to the caring measure, on how much the agent cares about each future self. This caring measure
38To be exact, being on the same branch does not make sense for a quantum-mechanical process, since each “change”
represents a measurement. However, we consider growing fat to be a completely “classical” process, in which the
natural evolution of the agent tends towards being fat.
39Or, at least one that he has influence over.
40Not considering the Glasgow Coma Scale
41This may sound similar to Wallace’s initial argument about consistency, but the difference is with the assumption,
not the outcome of not being able to make rational choices.
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should be a factor of the utility, and not of branch weight. With the decision-theoretic model, there
is a physical origin for the relative branch weights, and we could change our expected utility in each
branch, instead of modifying the branch weights. For involuntary choices that lead to branches
in which the initial agent has different caring measure for each, the utility in each branch should
also change in accordance to his caring measure, with the branch weight staying the same as the
probability measure. If the agent cares more about the fat version of him, then there must be some
additional benefit or utility to being fat in that branch. The decision-theoretic model seems to be
right about the branch weights, although the argument about inconsistency is unconvincing.
8.3 Single Level of Decision Making
In Wallace’s scheme (2012), he considers only a utility maximizing function for only one layer of
branching to arrive at the Born Rule. Of course, there are many ways to skin a cat, and those
arriving to confirm the Born Rule may not be right in the end. Proving a known result usually
suffers from some form of confirmation bias, so we may not know if the decision-theoretic program
is valid. The derivation of Born rule may be completely misguided using decision theory, since the
derivation does not provide any new findings that we could potentially falsify.
There is no reason why we would simply maximize the utility for one branching event: for a
clearly optimal outcome, we would want to optimize for every branching process in the future.
Deutsch and Wallace terminated their derivations after arriving at the Born weights for a single
decision-making level. However, it may be rational for someone to take a loss in the present stage,
to reliably reap huge rewards at the next stage. Therefore, this single level of decision making takes
into account the expected utility in the future as well. For example, a high school graduate may
choose to enroll in a lower-ranked college, just to graduate top of the class. Of course, we could
extend this argument ad infinitum, instead of stopping at two levels of decision. Considering the
expected utility from all the future events, the expected payoff may be clear at the first level of
decision.
However, it is not clear how we are able to compute such payoffs, given the complex branching
structure. While it is true that provided with the same physically-relevant information, two agents
will make the same choices (objectivity in probability), but it is not known if the information
provided will reliably lead to the correct choice with the greater payoff. For such a summation of all
subsequent utilities and branch weights, the decision making approach would end up being overly
involved for a physical theory.42
Rational agents also incur a cost in computing such expected payoffs after a few decisions,
and therefore, they tend not to compute their utility beyond two or three levels. Such costs of
computation are not factored in decision theory, leading to a partial failure to calculate the exact
utility, even if provided with the relevant information for such a computation to an eventual end
state. Without a well-defined payoff, we may run into problems with diachronic consistency again.
42Of course, that’s not to say that current physical theories are short and sweet, but this seems to be awfully
complication – it is like the modeling of human behavior using first principles.
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8.4 Subjective Probability
We save the most critical argument for the last: it is fundamentally unclear why we should be
considering decision making at all, besides the possibility that it may work.43 If we were to adopt
realism, that our reality is ontologically independent of our beliefs and perceptions, then it is
problematic for the decision theorist. If branching is a primitive and fundamental feature of the
universe, then it is weird that we need the existence of rational beings to derive the Born Rule. If
this truly is the case, then we have to separate the evolution of the universe (or multi-verse) into two
epochs, one before the evolution of rational beings, and one after. (Even though the evolution of the
universe is governed solely by the Schrödinger’s equation, there will be no concept of probability or
branching before there were rational beings.) The evolution of the universe before rational beings
arose has to be quantitatively different from that after, since there is no Born rule before rational
beings. If there was a version of Born rule before us, then the derivation cannot rely on rational
decision making.
The argument against this is perhaps trivial: if all outcomes occur, then there must be rational
beings at t0. But this also means that there must be rational beings in every single branch since –
this seems like a definitive proof for aliens. One may be convinced by this, sure, but for purposes of
this argument, we do not assume the existence of aliens from the start of time.44
As argued in § 6.4, the only form of probability has to be objective. Any form of subjective
probability (that does not agree with the objective probability from the branch weights) is due to
incomplete information, and we should disregard computations of probabilities based on false or
incomplete premises. One of the main reasons for us to consider the Everett program is that it
allows for perfectly symmetric outcomes – there is no need for us to create models with elements of
symmetry-breaking. The symmetry from these results is a physical symmetry, not a belief symmetry.
The two symmetries may lead to the same numerical results for probabilities, but that does not
mean that they are the same (cf. § 6.4, on dualism). If the Everett program views the evolution of
the universe as deterministic, then we should be able to say that the cause of physical evolution is
due to certain physical laws and symmetries. If we consider the evolution of the branching structure
as an underlying physical process, then it is not clear how decision making would affect the evolution.
One could make the argument that the results from decision theory correlates with the Born rule
perfectly, but ideally the derivation should causally relate decision making and the physical process
of branching.45
The decision theorist would say that physical laws lead to rational decision making, which in turn
lead to the observed probabilities. As such, we disagree on the ontology of probabilities. Beside the
initial objection about the lack of rational beings at t0, there is another argument against (human)
rationality. Perhaps the entire program of decision theory rests on the assumption of personal
43Yes, the hopes of it working is a very compelling argument, but there is the lack of a motivation for this scheme
to work.
44I make no claims about aliens existing now, so I don’t expect violent protests outside my house.
45For example, can we say that decision making causes branching?
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utility-maximization. At this stage when utility-maximization is not well-understood,46 it seems
premature for physicists to appeal to such an assumption to prove a physical law (Born rule).
The decision theorist may bring out another point: that decision-theoretic methods are used to
derive (or to provide a proof of) the Born rule, and there may be other methods to show that the
Born rule is derivable. If that is the case, we should demand that the other methods should not
involve rational agents. (The Sebens-Carroll approach still requires rational agents.) That in itself
makes the “other” version more general since it does not need to assume for the existence of rational
agents, and there is no good reason to believe that the decision-theoretic model is as relevant.
Perhaps a last ditch attempt for the decision theorist to save this program is to appeal to the
definitions of probability – he would say that probabilities are only well-defined in the context of
decision making among rational agents. If that is truly the case, then the Everett program would
only make sense with rational beings, since probability is not well-defined otherwise. The Principal
Principle (§ 6.4) cannot function as a fundamental physical law without rational agents. Before the
evolution of rational beings, the Everett program must have been quite different, and it is not quite
sure why physical properties of the universe depend on rational beings. This point is related to the
strong form of the anthropic principle, that the universe evolved to eventually contain conscious
life. If there are no intelligent/rational beings in the universe, then physical laws would proceed
differently from the ill-definition of probability.
Rational beings in the universe are usually seen as inconsequential in the grand scheme of the
universe, considering the short time span of existence of humans and the small volume we occupy
relative to the universe. For decision theory to work in the Everett program, we may have to
reconsider the place of rational beings in this universe, and at this point, this seems to be adding an
extra assumption to the Everett program of quantum mechanics.
9 Concluding Remarks
At the end of the day, we have to admit that many of the issues discussed here are far from settled.
The decision-theoretic model is quite robust in defending itself from the alternatives, although
it is in my opinion that the probabilities of the Born rule should be more fundamental. This is
perhaps one of the rare attempts in science where we are not appealing to a reductionist viewpoint –
we are using concepts of decision making (that supervenes elementary particle theory) to explain
elementary particle theory. Perhaps there is a deeper connection between decision making and
physical theories, that suggests some form of the anthropic principle.
46For example, we are not sure about personal utility functions, or if we even seek the maximization of such a
function. We may be concerned about our kins (kin selection), we may also be concerned about justice or distributing
welfare, we may also be genuinely altruistic, for example.
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Appendix
I: Wallace’s derivation of the Born rule
Firstly, suppose that there is going to be a game of coin toss, and an agent is thinking of betting
$10 on the outcome of the coin (being heads), at even odds. If he wins, he gets $10, else, he loses
$10. Should the agent accept the bet? The agent clearly has to conduct a cost-benefit analysis
of the bet. According to decision theory, the agent ought to assign a value of utility V(+$10) to
getting $10, and a utility (or disutility) V(−$10) to losing $10. He should also assign a utility V($0)
to represent his neutral state, of neither winning or losing. Therefore, he should take on the bet
only if this condition is satisfied:
P (heads)× V(+$10) + (1− P (heads))× V(−$10) > V($0). (10.1)
He is indifferent if the expression above is saturated. In other words, the decision theory model is
concerned with the maximization of utility given the outcomes and probabilities. Why should he
maximize his utility this way, instead of maximizing utility through some other functions or the
probabilities (the square, the logarithm, the exponential, etc.)? The standard answer is that if the
agent has a preference between two bets, given certain constraints on rationality,47 then we are able
to prove a representation theorem, that there is a unique probability function and a unique utility
function48 such that the agent would prefer one bet over the other iff the bet has a higher expected
utility.49,50
There are two principles in the representation theorem (Savage, 1972): the first being transitivity
and the second being dominance. Transitivity means what we might expect in mathematics, that if
an agent prefers A to B, and also B to C, then he prefers A to C. Dominance means if an agent
will end up better off in A than B regardless, then he should choose A over B.
Now, we invoke the structure of EQM, and replace the classical coin toss with a quantum
mechanical version: the measure of electron spin along some axis, when the electron was prepared
in a state of superposition of both spin-up and spin-down. We are now concerned about the two
sets of branches (note that we may have more than two branches, but there are two distinct sets
with interesting outcomes). The setup of the bet remains the same as before, that he is considering
a bet of $10 on the outcome of the spin measurement being spin-up. Since both outcomes happen
in the Everett interpretation, then the agent has to weigh the costs and benefits that happen to
future copies of him in the different branches. A bet like this makes sense in this case, just as it did
in the coin toss.
Out of the many strategies possible for the agent in the Everettian case, one possible strategy is
the Born rule strategy, that maximizes expected utility according to the Born rule weights of each
47Also, we have to consider that the set of available bets having a certain structure
48Up to a positive affine transformation.
49For an agent where this theorem is not represented in such a way, we consider that agent to be acting irrationally.
50There is an issue there, of whether the unique probability function is related to the real probabilities that we see
in the real world. This is discussed in § 8.1, to reduce clutter in this section.
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set of branches. In such a case, there is no difference in behavior between the Everettian case and
the Copenhagen case (if the agent uses the Born rule to maximize his utility, which is an expected
move). This argument is insufficient, however. We have to consider if this strategy is the only
strategy, and it might be, according to the quantum version of the representation theorem. The
formal proof is available in § 5.7 of Wallace (2012), but only a sketch of the proof will be presented
here for simplicity.
Since the setup of the measurement, the measurement itself and the payoffs are all physical
processes, we could simplify these processes by a single unitary transformation, called acts. Therefore,
the agent’s rational preference could be expressed by an ordering on unitary transformations.51
Decoherence provides the structure in the Hilbert space, and so we decompose the Hilbert space into
subspaces, each representing a possible macrostate pi (or branch), although the exact decomposition
is underspecified due to the indeterminate grain size.52 If the agent sees his future state in a
particular macrostate after performing a measurement, then the macrostate is available to him.
The agent is assumed not to care about the microstate if our macrostates are well set up; even
so, the agent might not care about the differences over selected macrostates too. For example, if
the winning bet entails a dégustation menu in a three Michelin-starred restaurant, the agent may
be indifferent to the gender of the waitperson, although a difference in gender is a difference in
macrostate. Therefore, we could do a grouping of macrostates into reward subspaces, and the agent
truly cares about which subspace he is in now, since each subspace entails a (genuinely53) different
reward.
Now, we consider the acts available at each event, 54 such that an act that is available at an
event E = pi1 ∨ pi2 ∨ · · · ∨ piN is the conditional act of performing Ui at pii, where Ui is the particular
unitary transformation. For the preference between acts at state Φ, we write
Û Φ Û ′, (10.2)
where U and U ′ are different acts, which should both exist at Φ.
Now, we consider the axioms used in decision theory.55 There are two classes of axioms, richness
and rationality. Richness axioms are used for the acts available to the agent (how rich the structure
is), and rationality is used for the ordering of preferences. The richness axioms56 are:
• Reward availability: All rewards are available to the agent at any macrostate
• Branching availability: Given any set of positive real numbers p1, . . . , pn which sums to unity,
an agent can always choose some act which has n different macrostates as possible outcomes,
51It is true that not all unitary transformations represent something physical, but this argument is orthogonal to
the one we are making at the moment.
52In the model the decomposition is well-defined, but this is simply artificial.
53As opposed to superficially.
54An event is defined within the reward subspace, in which we can consider event spaces, which is a more formal
way of putting the argument across.
55The axioms used may not be mainstream.
56The following lists are adapted directly from Wallace (2012), edited only for clarity.
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and gives weight pi to the ith outcome.
• Erasure: Given a pair of states Φ ∈ E and Λ ∈ F for the same reward, there is an act Û
available at E and an act V̂ available at F such that ÛΨ = V̂ Λ.
• Problem continuity: For each event E, the set of acts available at E is an open subset of the
set of unitary transformations from E to H.
The first two axioms should be clear from our discussions earlier, so the focus is on the latter
two axioms. Erasure as an axiom ensures that the agent does not care about his location within
the reward space, and that he could ignore or forget about any facts beyond his reward. This is
justified since in decision theory, we only care about the outcomes (rewards) and not the other
details related to them. The last axiom will be discussed together with the second set of axioms.
The following list shows the rationality axioms:
• Ordering: The relation Φ is a total ordering for each Φ on the set of acts available at Φ.
This means that the relation is transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric.
• Diachronic consistency: If U is available at Φ, and (for each i) if in the ith branch after U
is performed there are acts Vi, V ′i available, and for each i if the agent’s future self in the
ith branch will prefer Vi to V ′i , then the agent prefers performing U followed by the Vis to
performing U followed by the V ′i s.
• Macrostate indifference: An agent does not care about the microstate, as long as he is within
a macrostate.
• Branching indifference: An agent does not care about branching per se: if a certain measure-
ment leaves the future copies of him in N different macrostates but does not change any of
their rewards, he is indifferent as to whether or not the measure is performed.
• State supervenience: An agent’s preferences between acts depend only on what physical state
they actually leave his branch in. For example, if UΦ = U ′Φ′ and that V Φ = V ′Φ′, then an
agent who prefers U to V given that the initial state is Φ should also prefer U ′ to V ′ given
that the initial state is Φ′.
• Solution continuity: If for some state Φ, Û Φ Û ′, then sufficiently small permutations of Û
and Û ′ will not change this.
The first two axioms on the list are general to decision theory, while the last four are specific for
Everettian decision making. Preference ordering is very much expected in rational decision making,
since this prevents us from having inconsistent behavior. Having a well-defined ordering on the set
of acts allows us to rank and make choices.
Diachronic consistency eliminates a conflict of interests between agents and their future selves.
This allows us to follow an agent through his branches with identical preference ordering. The
process of decision making takes a finite amount of time, and if we are allowed to violate this
consistency principle, it is not clear how decisions are made in reality. Of course, it is possible for us
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to violate this principle, such as being on a diet and upon seeing delicious cookies, one may not be
able to stop himself, but such a class of action is generally deemed to be irrational, or exhibits a
form of internal conflict. Therefore, since we are considering rational decision making, we can safely
ignore such concerns and adopt the axiom.
Macrostate indifference has been previously explained, and the agent should only care about his
macrostate – since he has no control over his microstate.
Now, we return to the axiom on problem continuity. Together with branching indifference and
solution continuity, these three axioms are the limitations of physical agents. Without problem
continuity, a discontinuous preference order would require the agent to make arbitrarily fine
distinctions between acts. Without solution continuity, we could not extend the preference order
to account for arbitrarily small changes in acts. Lastly, without branching indifference, decision
making would be inconsistent, since branching occurs so frequently and is widespread. As long
as the rewards stay the same, an agent should not care about branching into his future selves.
State supervenience is an axiom that states that the agent’s preferences supervene on the physically
realized state of the branch. This means that the agent does not care about the non-actual quantum
state in his branch, since these states do not affect him in any relevant way.
Now, we are able to prove four results:
• Equivalence lemma: If two acts assign the same weight to each reward, the agent must be
indifferent between them.
• Nullity lemma: An agent is indifferent to a possible outcome of an act iff that act has weight
zero.
• Dominance lemma: Suppose that two acts each only have two possible rewards r1, r2 as
outcomes, with r1  r2 and that the first act assigns a higher weight to r1 than the second
act does. Then the first act must be preferred to the second.
• Born-rule theorem: There is a utility function on the set of rewards unique up to affine
transformations, such that one act is preferred to another iff its expected utility, calculated
with respect to this utility function and to the quantum-mechanical weights of each reward, is
higher.
For the first lemma on equivalence, we assume that we have two acts A and B, and each act, we
prepare a system in a superposition α |+〉+ β |−〉, and we measure the system in the appropriate
basis {|+〉 , |−〉}. For the first act A, the reward is given on the outcome |+〉; for set B, the reward
is on the other outcome |−〉. Therefore, for the two acts we have the states as below:
A: α |+〉 ⊗ |reward〉+ β |−〉 ⊗ |no reward〉 (10.3)
B: α |+〉 ⊗ |no reward〉+ β |−〉 ⊗ |reward〉 . (10.4)
Using erasure, the future selves of the agent would be able to remove the measurement process,
leaving only the reward. Now, we have:
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A with erasure: α |0〉 ⊗ |reward〉+ β ∣∣0′〉⊗ |no reward〉 (10.5)
B with erasure: β |0〉 ⊗ |reward〉+ α ∣∣0′〉⊗ |no reward〉 . (10.6)
With branch indifference, the agent does not care about the erasure happening. Invoking
diachronic consistency, the agent at the start of the measurement is indifferent between A and A
after erasure (and the same goes for B). We end off this proof by letting α = β, and thus the
two quantum states are the same, and invoking state supervenience for the agent to be indifferent
between the two states. Once we use the transitive property from preference ordering, we are done
showing that the agent has no preference between A and B.
The null and dominance lemmas are extensions of the proof above, and for further details, refer
to Wallace (2012). Assuming that the reader is convinced of these lemmas, let us move on to show
the final result: the Born rule theorem.
Suppose there are two rewards R and S, and R  S. Now, we assign utilities to R and S – let R
have utility 1, and S have utility 0. If we now introduce a third reward T that satisfies R  T  S,
we have a unique number U(T ) such that the agent is indifferent between two cases – 1) getting T
for certain, 2) getting R on a branch weight of U(T ) and S on the other branches. Now, define a
new act with these three rewards, on branch weights of w(R), w(S) and w(T ). As above, the future
selves of the agent in the T branch are going to be indifferent between doing nothing and case
2, as they consider the action of the original agent. Applying diachronic consistency, the original
agent is indifferent between these two cases too. Applying the diachronic consistency once again,
the original agent is indifferent between the previous act and an act with delivering the reward
R with a weight w(R) + w(T )U(T ), and a third act which returns the reward S with the weight
w(S) + (1− U(T ))w(T ). In this case, the utilities are exactly the same, and therefore the agent is
indifferent. If the agent is indifferent, then the utilities are the same, using the equivalence lemma.
Once we incorporate the dominance lemma, then one act is preferred to another iff the first act has
a higher utility. With this, we complete the sketch of the proof of the Born rule theorem. As such,
a rational decision maker must assign the same probabilities as what the Born rule tells us to the
relative weights of each group of branches with the same rewards.
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